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10 August 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George Carver, SAVA

SUBJECT

Proposed Outline for Presentation on

Vietnam to the Agency's Senior Seminar

1. Attached are three brief papers: A memorandum describing the meeting, 27 July 1971, between Mr. Carver, of the Senior Seminar Staff, concerning organization of the Vietnam presentation Mr. Carver has agreed to make to the Seminar. The second paper is a "Scope Note" on Vietnam drafted by the Seminar Staff after discussing the 27 July meeting with Mr. Carver. Some significant differences will be noted. In the view of the Seminar Staff, these differences are negotiable but it is hoped that agreement can be reached to accept the version described in the "Scope Note" as this would articulate well with other presentations being made to the Seminar.

schedule for	third paper is a Block III of the information.	copy of the most recent draft Senior Seminar attached for
Mr. Carver's	Information.	
		Chief, Senior Seminar

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BLOCK III - Approved For Release 2000/01/03 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000700010020-8

SCOPE NOTE FOR PANEL PRESENTATION ON - "VIETNAM AND CIA"

PANEL: Mr. George Carver (Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs)

Ambassador William Colby, former Chief, CORDS

Mr. George Allen, formerly Deputy to Mr. Carver

GENERAL ORIENTATION OF THE PANEL PRESENTATION

The direction sought in the presentation is to identify turning points in the Vietnam conflict and to describe and interpret the part that intelligence played in influencing policy decisions relating to these major events. It is hoped that this examination of the Agency's role vis-a-vis Vietnam can be treated in terms of the impact of our finished intelligence on the course of US involvement in Vietnam, rather than a description and evaluation of CIA operations and programs -important as these are in other respects -- to our overall Vietnam effort. Along with this look at the intelligence contribution made by the Agency in the Vietnam problem, it would be useful to consider, concurrently, the history and dynamics of CIA interaction on major events in Vietnam with the White House, State, Defense and other US agencies, starting with the period commencing immediately before Diem's overthrow and ending with the most recent events.

ORGANIZATION

It is proposed that the panel presentation be in two parts.

The first forty-five minutes would be given over to a summary

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statement of US involvement in Vietnam with a historical exposition of the way the war unfolded and the Agency's intelligence contribution. This period would commence just prior to the coup against Diem. This part would be followed with a more definitive exposition of CIA's role in the formulation of policy on Vietnam and inter-agency relations. The panelists might seek to dispel some of the emotionalism surrounding the subject of Vietnam and to correct some of the "factual errors" that have grown into general acceptance about Vietnam policy decisions. (For example: there is a tendency to believe the US jumped massively into the Vietnam situation without careful policy consideration).

The panel presentation may be divided into three chronological periods:

- (1) $\underline{1957-1963}$: The latter days of Diem's rule the coup against him and the effects this had on US interests and policy toward Vietnam.
- (2) 1963-1967: The period of massive US expansion in Vietnam, militarily and in the intelligence fields.
- (3) 1967 to present: The crest of US involvement in Vietnam, the considerations that turned build-up to withdrawal and disengagement of US forces and the "Vietnamization" policy.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting With George Carver (SAVA) - BLOCK III: Vietnam Presentation

- met with George Carver, SAVA, to discuss the organization of a three-man panel on Vietnam (this presentation will appear in BLOCK III). Carver recommended the panel be led by himself and include Mr. William Colby, formerly head of CORDS, Saigon, and George Allen, who was Carver's deputy during the period 1952-67. Carver attempted unsuccessfully to reach Mr. Colby at State by telephone during our meeting. He will assume responsibility for arranging Colby's participation. Presumably, he will also ask Allen to participate, although this was not affirmed at the meeting.
- 2. Mr. Carver proposed the panel presentation be in two parts. The first hour and fifteen minutes would be given over to a summary statement of US involvement in Vietnam with a historical exposition of the way the war unfolded and the Agency's participation. Mr. Carver would hope to remove some of the emotionalism surrounding this subject and to correct some of the "factual error" that has come to be accepted about the Vietnam issue. For example -- there is a tendency to believe the US jumpted massively into the Vietnam situation without careful policy consideration -- this is not ture. He would not recommend a bibliography on the subject. However, he suggested that seminar

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participants might wish to read his two articles on Vietnam which appeared in the Foreign Affairs Quarterly (April 1965 and Other than these, Carver thought that Donald Lancaster's book on Vietnam (title not yet available) was about as an honest and factual as would be found. He believed Chet Cooper's book was misleading in places simply because Mr. Cooper was not fully aware of how some events evolved.

The second part of the panel show would be a collective 3. tracing and evaluation of the Agency's role in Vietnam, commencing briefly with OOS relations in that area, the break in the late 1940's-early 1950 and subsequent recreation of Saigon Station.

The Lansdale mission followed by the Diem coup and the effect of Diem's

/Mr. Colby would have a lot to say overthrow on US interests. about this aspect of our relations). Carver noted that he, Colby and Allen disagree on some things about Vietnam, and he thought this disagreement would be a healthy thing in presentation. example, Carver believes the Diem coup was inevitable -- we did Cause it to hoppen , not have anything to do with it. Colby does not fully agree with this.

- Carver breaks the second part of the panel presentation down into five parts, as follows:
- The period of reviving US interest in (1) 1950-1954: Vietnam largely resulting from the outbreak of the Korean War and the concern that Peking might march South as a complementary expansion effort into French Indo China, Thailand, etc.

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- (2) 1954-1956: The Lansdale period when Dicm was in power and was fighting his internal (domestic) opposition.
- (3) 1957-1963: The latter days of Diem's rule and his overthrow.
- (4) 1963-1967: The period of US expansion in Vietnam, militarily and in the intelligence field.
- (5) 1967 to the present: This is a period marked by the development and operation of CORDS under Bill Colby, for the most part, and of US disengagement in Vietnam.
- 5. The presentation would conclude with commentary about the course of CIA's relations and role among the Government agencies in regard to Vietnam with Carver handling the Washington end of things, and Colby describing relations among the agencies in the field (Vietnam, etc.).
- draft a scope note for Mr. Carver based upon the above outline, and to forward this to him for his reference and that of the panel members in preparing their presentation. He will also send a copy of the Seminar Schedule of Block III, for Carver's information. We advised that the Vietnam presentation is scheduled for 18 October at the Chamber of Commerce Building, Arlington.

Senior Seminar

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25X1 BLOCK MANAGER:		CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT SCHEDULE - BLOCK # III2 BLOCK TITIE: World Trends of Significance for Policy and Intelligence				
·	MONDAY 18 Oct.	TUESDAY 19 Oct	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	
0830 0930 0930 25X1	TECHNOLOGY	<u>EVALUATION</u>				
.1130 1200						
FM 1230 1330	VIETNAM CASE STUDY Panel: Carver/Allen(?)/ Colby(?)					
1230 1550 1630 1730			and the second s	,		
1900 2000 2000 2100 2200	<u>xe</u>	Carefeden	tad			